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Introduction to Abstractionism
Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg
1.1 WHAT IS ABSTRACTIONISM?
Abstractionism in philosophy of mathematics has its origins in Gottlob Frege’s
logicism—a position Frege developed in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century. Frege’s main aim was to reduce arithmetic and analysis to logic in
order to provide a secure foundation for mathematical knowledge. As is well
known, Frege’s development of logicism failed. The infamous Basic Law V—
one of the six basic laws of logic Frege proposed in his magnum opus Grund-
gesetze der Arithmetik—is subject to Russell’s Paradox. The striking feature of
Frege’s Basic Law V is that it takes the form of an abstraction principle. The
general form of an abstraction principle can by symbolised like this:1
§(↵) = §( ) $ ↵ ⇠  
where ‘§’ is a term-forming operator applicable to expression of the type of ↵
and  , and ⇠ is an equivalence relation on entities denoted by expressions of
that type. Accordingly, abstraction principles are biconditionals that feature
an equivalence relation on the right-hand side and an identity statement on
the left-hand side. The abstracta denoted by the terms featuring in the identity
statement on the left are taken to be introduced, in some sense, by the ab-
straction principle, giving the equivalence on the right-hand side conceptual
priority over them. More on this below.
Frege’s ill-fated Basic Law V, involves co-extentionality (of functions) as the
relevant equivalence relation on the right-hand side, introducing, what Frege
termed value-ranges, –"'("), on the left:2
1Here and below, we will omit prefixed universal quantifiers in abstraction principles. We
are thereby in e¯ect neglecting the distinction between schematic and axiomatic (or universal)
formulations of abstraction principles. In the context of full impredicative second-order logic,
these formulations are equivalent, but in systems with weaker second-order comprehension (see
p. 19 below), these come apart: the schematic formulations entail the axiomatic ones, but not vice
versa; see e.g. Heck (1996, §1), Fine (2002, pp. 36–38), or Linnebo (2004, p. 158).
2In words: The value-range of function f is identical to the value-range of function   if and
only if f and   have the same value for any argument. The value-range of a function is roughly
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2 Introduction to Abstractionism
–" f (") = –"  (") $ 8x( f (x) =   (x))
Ultimately, Frege was unable to find a suitable alternative for his Basic
Law V (more on this in §2 below) and gave up on his logicist project.3 In the
latter half of the twentieth century, logicism enjoyed a revival. Its main catalyst
was Crispin Wright’s Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Object, published in
1983. Wright soon joined forces with Bob Hale and together they developed
and defended a view now often referred to as “neo-Fregeanism” or sometimes
more specifically as the “Scottish school of neo-Fregeanism”.4 The main tenet
of neo-Fregeanism is to revive a version of Frege’s logicism by substituting the
inconsistent Basic Law V with a principle called Hume’s Principle. Like Basic
Law V, Hume’s Principle is an abstracti n principle:
Hume’s Principle (HP)
N x : F x = N x :Gx $ F ⇡ G
where ‘N x : F x’ stands for “the (cardinal) number of F s” and ‘⇡’ denotes the
equivalence relation of equinumerosity between concepts.5 Hume’s Principle
was, of course, considered by Frege in his Grundlagen der Arithmetik in 1884.
He rejected it, however, considering it ill-suited as a foundation for arithmetic
(more on this below). It was not until Geach (1955) that this way to revive a
version of Frege’s Logicism was reconsidered. Geach claimed that Frege’s deci-
sion to identify numbers with extensions was questionable and suggested that
one could prove the infinity of the number series without drawing on “any
what we would call its graph today. In the special case of concepts, the value-range is the extension
of the concept. Concepts F and G have the same extensions if and only they are co-extensional
(i.e., the same objects fall under them): –"F " = –"G" $ 8x(F x $ Gx)
3As we now know, if embedded in a weaker logic—e.g., predicative second-order logic—Basic
Law V does not entail a contradiction. This has generated some very interesting research on
identifying consistent fragments of Frege’sGrundgesetze logic that retain Basic Law V—for further
details see §1.3 below. For all we know, Frege never considered a weakening of the logic as a way
out of the paradox. Indeed, it might seem to go against Frege’s general conception of logic.
4In his excellent critical survey, MacBride (2003) distinguishes “neo-logicism” from “neo-
Fregeanism”. Neo-logicism stands for “the doctrine that Frege’s judgement was premature [. . .]
Frege should not have abandoned (HP)” (p. 106) while “neo-Fregeanism” stands for the general
conception of the relation between language and reality that Hale and Wright are interpreted to
have adopted. We here use the term “neo-Fregeanism” to stand for Hale and Wright’s version of
Abstractionism generally.
5HP may be glossed as: the cardinal number belonging to the concept F is identical to the
cardinal number belonging to the concept G if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the objects falling under F and those falling underG. The equivalence relation of equinu-
merosity (one-to-one correspondence, bijection) can be formulated in purely (second-order) logi-
cal vocabulary. In full detail, HP is the following statement:
N x : F x = N x :Gx $
9R 8x[F x   9y(Gy ^ Rxy ^ 8z(Gz ^ Rxz   z = y))] ^
8y[Gy   9x(F x ^ Rxy ^ 8z(F z ^ Rzy   z = x))] 
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What is Abstractionism? 3
special set theory” (Geach, 1955, p. 569). In 1965, Charles Parson went a step
further and noted explicitly that the derivation of the axioms of arithmetic
“could be carried out by taking [Hume’s Principle] as an axiom” (Parsons,
1965, p. 194).
It was, however, not until Wright (1983) that such proof was presented.
Here,Wright proves that the axioms of arithmetic can be derived fromHume’s
Principle using second-order logic and Frege’s definition of zero, predecession,
and natural number. Following Boolos (1990), the proof is now known as
Frege’s Theorem.6
Wright not merely establishes Frege’s Theorem; he also o¯ers the first ro-
bust philosophical defense of Hume’s Principle as a foundational principle. In
contrast to Frege, who considered his Basic Law V to be a logical law, Wright
does not take Hume’s Principle to be purely logical but regards it more akin to
a definition or explanation of the concept cardinal number.7 What is impor-
tant here in particular is the status of Hume’s Principle as an abstraction prin-
ciple: the fact that Hume’s Principle takes the form of an abstraction principle
makes it especially suited as an explanation of the concept cardinal number
and thus as a foundational principle.
So understood, we can regard neo-Fregeans among the main proponents of
Abstractionism: the view that abstraction principles play a crucial role in the
proper foundation of arithmetic, analysis, and possibly other areas of mathe-
matics. Abstractionism therefore has two main aspects, a mathematical and a
philosophical one. The main aim of the mathematical aspect of any abstraction-
ist programme is the mathematics of abstraction—bluntly put: proving mathe-
matical theorems about abstraction principles or taking abstraction principles
as basic axioms and investigating the resulting theories. A primary aim is to
capture various mathematical theories, such as arithmetic, analysis, complex
analysis, or set theory as deriving from a few basic abstraction principles and
(versions of) higher-order logic. Frege’s Theorem is one of the most impor-
tant result for a mathematical Abstractionist, and numerous other interesting
results have been discovered since.8
The philosophical aspect of Abstractionism is to o¯er a philosophical ac-
count of why it is beneficial to adopt abstraction principles as foundations for
arithmetic or other mathematical theories. Broadly speaking, we can distin-
guish three kinds of philosophical themes concerning philosophical Abstrac-
tionism: semantic, epistemological, and ontological.
What we call semantic Abstractionism9 is the thesis that our capacity to
6Compare also Heck (2011a, 2012), who provides an insightful and detailed account of the
history of Frege’s Theorem and discusses the question whether Frege himself was aware of this
theorem.
7In fact, this is in stark contrast to Frege. In his Grundgesetze, Frege notes that Basic Law V is
not to be understood as a definition of the concept value-range; see Frege (1903, §146).
8See §1.3 below, were we will provide a short overview of some technical results.
9Semantic Abstractionism is sometimes identified with Abstractionism simpliciter, see
e.g. Heck (2011a), p. 14.
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4 Introduction to Abstractionism
have singular thoughts about objects of a certain type derives from and is
constituted by an appreciation of the truth-conditions of identity judgements
about objects of that type. The identity judgements involve the fundamental
way of referring to objects of that type. The crucial claim of semantic Abstrac-
tionism is then that the truth-conditions of such identity judgements can be
given by means of an abstraction principle, involving an equivalence relation
of the relevant kind. Connected to this thesis is the claim often made by se-
mantic abstractionists that abstraction principles are not only ideally suited to
provide for our capacity of singular thought but also that they can introduce
us to a new concept.
To explain the main claim of semantic Abstractionism, let us briefly con-
sider a more “mundane” type of abstraction principle:
Abstraction Principle for Directions (APd )
The direction of line a equals the direction of line b
if and only if line a and line b are parallel.
d(x) = d(y) $ x // y
Based on this abstraction principle (featuring parallelism of lines as the rele-
vant equivalence relation), we can grasp the concept direction. Given that
identity judgements involve the fundamental way of referring to objects of
this kind, it is by means of APd that we can have singular thoughts about
the objects falling under the concept direction. Abstraction principles thus
provide a way of grasping and apprehending objects, in particular abstract ob-
jects such as directions or numbers.10 Contributions in Part II of this volume
discuss various issues relating to semantic Abstractionism.
Epistemic Abstractionism is the view that abstraction principles are, in some
sense, epistemically innocent. The basic claim is that abstraction principles, or
at least those abstraction principles that fulfill certain criteria for being “good”,
are ideally suited to be warrantedly accepted as basic principles.11 As early as
1983, Wright made the claim that Hume’s Principle qua abstraction principle,
is epistemically innocent given its status as a kind of definition:
“The fundamental truths of number theory would be revealed as consequences of an
explanation: a statement whose role is to fix the character of a certain concepts.”
10As we will discuss later, Frege himself rejected abstraction principles as genuinely concept-
constitutive by raising what is now known as the Julius Caesar problem, see §1.2 below. The
neo-Fregeans have o¯ered numerous solutions to the problem, such as Wright (1983) and Hale
and Wright (2001b). For more recent challenges against semantic abstractionism compare Part
II of this volume. For further discussion of the neo-Fregean solution of the Caesar problem in
particular, see Sullivan and Potter (1997), Stirton (2003), Potter and Sullivan (2005), Pedersen
(2009), and Kim (2011), amongst others. For a response to Potter and Sullivan see Hale and
Wright (2008).
11Establishing the correct criteria for distinguishing “good” from “bad” abstraction principle is
a di˘culty known as the Bad Company objection, which we will discuss in a little more detail in
§1.5 below.
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History of Abstractionism 5
(Wright, 1983, p. 153)
As a result, Hume’s Principle itself was regarded as a definition and so as an
analytic truth that merely fixes the truth conditions of the concept of number.
George Boolos and others opposed this conception of Hume’s Principle as an
analytic definition due to its substantial ontological commitments.12
There are other attempts to justify the foundational status of Hume’s Prin-
ciple, e.g. in Hale and Wright (2000), it is regarded as a specific type of stipula-
tive implicit definition which explains our non-inferential a priori knowledge
of Hume’s Principle.13 In the latest development of epistemic Abstractionism,
it is argued that we have an entitlement, i.e. a certain type of non-evidential and
non-inferential warrant, to accept Hume’s Principle. What combines all these
approaches is the underlying thought that Hume’s Principle qua abstraction
principle is concept-constituting or analytic of the concept cardinal number:
we are (defeasibly) warranted to accept the principle because of its meaning-
constituting character. It is here where epistemic Abstractionism draws on
views defended by semantic Abstractionism. Contributions in Part III of this
volume develop and discuss new forms of epistemic Abstractionism.
The thesis we call ontological Abstractionism is the view that good abstrac-
tion principles introduce new terms referring to sui generis objects. That is,
in the case of Hume’s Principle, the number-terms so introduced refer to sui
generis abstract objects, namely cardinal numbers.14 Thus, an ontological ab-
stractionist defends a broadly platonist metaphysical picture of mathematical
objects. However, this view has not gone unchallenged: Michael Dummett,
one of the staunchest critics of the Neo-Fregean programme, repeatedly takes
issue with the platonist aspects of ontological Abstractionism.15 Contribu-
tions in Part II of this volume continue this line of criticism and question
to what extend abstraction principles are indeed compatible with a broadly
platonist conception of mathematical objects.
1.2 HISTORY OF ABSTRACTIONISM
Philosophers and mathematicians have entertained abstraction principles be-
fore Frege. Also his contemporaries, such as Dedekind, von Staudt, Plücker,
Stolz, Klein, Schlömilch, and Grassmann have used ideas that underlie, or are
similar to, Frege’s method of abstraction.16 Given that Frege’s work on ab-
straction principles has been the most influential in recent debates and given
12Compare Field (1984a,b) and Boolos (1997); see Wright (1999), Hale (1994a), and Ebert
(2008) for responses. See also Shapiro and Weir (2000) and Potter and Smiley (2001).
13See e.g. Rayo (2003), Ebert (2005b), or MacFarlane (2009) for criticism.
14There is a stronger view in the vicinity, first defended in Hale (1987) that all sui generis
abstract objects can be captured by appropriate abstraction principles.
15See his Dummett (1981a), Dummett (1981b), and Dummett (1991) for a discussion of some
his criticism, see for example MacBride (2003) and Ebert (2015).
16To what extend Frege was or might have been influenced by his contemporaries and teachers
is discussed in Wilson (1992, 2010), Tait (1996), and Mancosu (2015a, forthcoming). For a general
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6 Introduction to Abstractionism
that current forms of Abstractionism take Frege’s work as their starting point,
it is here where we begin our overview.
Frege develops his logicist account of arithmetic in Die Grundlagen der
Arithmetik (1884). His project started with the publication of Begri sschrift
in 1879, which also marks the birth of modern logic. What led him to the
development of his logic, concept-script, was the need for an appropriate tool
to develop his logicist programme. Frege writes:
The approach was here the following: first I attempted to reduce the concept of order-
ing in a series to that of logical sequence in order to proceed from here to the concept
of number. To prevent anything intuitive from penetrating here unnoticed, everything
had to depend on the gaplessness of the chain of inference. In striving to comply with
this demand in the strictest possible way, I found an obstacle in the inadequacy of lan-
guage; the more complex the relations became, the less I was able, given the resulting
unwieldiness of expressions, to attain the precision that my aim required. This need
then led me to the idea of the present concept-script.
(Frege, 1879, p. IV)
The requirement of gaplessness of the chains of inference is a theme that re-
mained at the heart of the logicist project. Begri sschrift, however, was not
all too well received by his contemporaries—a trend that continued with the
poor reception of his main work, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893/1903).17
Before publishing his Grundgesetze, a precursor of which already existed as a
nearly complete manuscript around 1882,18 Frege published Die Grundlagen
der Arithmetik intended as a more accessible introduction.19 It contains in its
first part criticisms of well-known approaches to the philosophy of arithmetic,
pro¯ered by Mill and Kant, and Frege’s contemporaries such as Schröder, Can-
tor, Hankel, and others. In the second part of Grundlagen, Frege develops his
logicism: the thesis that arithmetic is reducible to logic plus explicit defini-
tions and that therefore our arithmetical knowledge is grounded in our logical
knowledge.
We will here focus only on §§62–69 of Grundlagen, which Dummett re-
gards as the “most brilliant and philosophically most fruitful [passages] in the
book and the most important for Frege’s philosophy of mathematics, and, in-
deed, his philosophy generally” (Dummett, 1991, p. 111). It is here that Frege
performs the often celebrated linguistic turn, and it is here that he first con-
siders an abstraction principle—Hume’s Principle—as an answer to the most
basic question: “How, then, is a number given to us, if we do not have any
account of the role of abstraction in the nineteenth century and its relation to Greek mathematics
see Stein (1990).
17See in particular Frege’s Foreword to Grundgesetze, pp. x–xi, where he complains about the
lack of reception of his work and suggests that his requirement of gaplessness may seem o¯-putting
to many of his contemporaries.
18Compare Frege’s letter to Marty in Frege (1976), xxx/1, p. 163, and for discussion Heck
(2012), ch. 1.
19He seemed to have followed the advice from Carl Stumpf, who in a letter encouraged him to
spell out his ideas in a more accessible manner. See Frege (1976), XL, p. 257.
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History of Abstractionism 7
idea or intuition of it?” (Grundlagen, §62). The curious twist in the history
of Abstractionism is that Frege rejects the attempt to answer the question by
appeal to Hume’s Principle.
Frege explores addressing the epistemic challenge he poses at the beginning
of §62 by appeal to the context principle: only in the context of a sentence do
words have meaning.20 According Frege, then, to account for our knowledge
of numbers we have to explain the content of a sentence in which the number
word occurs, in particular, we require a general criterion that allows us to
recognise some object a as the same again. Frege’s proposal is to use Hume’s
Principle, which fixes the truth-conditions of identity statements involving
the concept cardinal number.21
It is exactly this basic proposal in which semantic and epistemic Abstrac-
tionism take their origin. The story, however, does not quite end here for
Frege: in the subsequent sections, he discusses three criticisms against the use
of Hume’s Principle qua abstraction principle to account for our grasp of num-
bers. He rejects the first two challenges, and then presents what is now known
as the Caesar Problem. Having considered the abstraction principle for direc-
tions, APd instead of HP in most of his discussion, Frege presents the follow-
ing challenge in §66:
In the proposition,
“the direction of a is identical with the direction of b”
the direction of a appears as object, and our definition a¯ords us a means of recognizing
this object as the same again, in case it should happen to appear in some other guise,
say as the direction of b . But this means does not su˘ce for all cases. One cannot,
for instance, decide on its basis whether England is the same as the direction of the
Earth’s axis. Please forgive the example which seems nonsensical! Of course, no one
will confuse England with the direction of the Earth’s axis; but that is no thanks to our
explanation. It says nothing as to whether the proposition
“the direction of a is identical with q”
should be a˘rmed or denied, unless q is given in the form of ‘the direction of b ’. What
we lack is the concept of direction [. . .]. (Frege, 1884, pp. 77–78)
The challenge is structurally similar to one raised in §56. Here, Frege’s ex-
ample does not involve the direction of the Earth’s axis and England, but
rather concerns the question whether Julius Caesar is a number—hence the
20“Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas.” We here follow Austin and
use “meaning” to render the German “Bedeutung” given that Frege is yet to draw his famous
sense-reference distinction.
21Frege does not use the term “Hume’s Principle”, but he does refer to a passage in Hume’s
Treatise (as quoted by Baumann (1869, p. 565), (Frege, 1884, p. 78)). The original reads as follows:
“We are in the possest of a precise standard, by which we can judge of the equality and propor-
tion of numbers; and according as they correspond or not to that standard, we determine their
relations, without any possibility of error. When two numbers are so combined, as that the one
has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal’; and ’tis for
want of such a standard of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteem’d a perfect
and infallible science.” (Hume, 1739/1987, book I, part III, section I, p. 71)
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8 Introduction to Abstractionism
label “Caesar Problem”.22 More generally, abstraction principles do not settle
truth-conditions of mixed identity statements of the form:
§(↵) = t
where t is not of the form §( ).
Frege rejects Hume’s Principle as an adequate foundation for his logicist
project for this reason, the Caesar Problem, and instead turns to an explicit
definition of cardinal numbers as extensions. On the basis of this explicit def-
inition, he then proceeds to derive Hume’s Principle as a theorem, and using
it and other presumed laws of logic and further explicit definitions, he o¯ers
proof sketches of numerous familiar laws of arithmetic.23
Unfortunately, Frege says preciously little about extensions—in fact, he
simply presupposes that the reader knows what extensions are and even con-
siders them ultimately superfluous for his logicism. In a tantalizing footnote
in §68 he writes:24
I believe that one could say instead of “extension of the concept’ simply “concept”.
[. . .] I presuppose that one knows what the extension of a concept is.
Given the lack of gapless proofs to establish the laws of number and the lack
of support for his notion of extension, Frege provides a somewhat cautiously
optimistic summary of his achievement in Grundlagen in §90:
I do not claim to have made the analytic character of arithmetical propositions more
than probable, since one may still doubt whether the proofs can be conducted solely
from purely logical laws, whether somewhere an unacknowledged premise of a di¯er-
ent kind is involved. Also, the concern is not su˘ciently addressed by the indications
I have given of the proofs of some of the propositions [. . .]. (Frege, 1884, p. 102)
So it was the goal of his magnum opus, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, to es-
tablish beyond doubt what according to Grundlagen is a probable account of
arithmetic by providing gapless proofs and by stating explicitly the basic laws
and explicit definitions required for these proofs. It is here that we encounter
the second twist in the Abstractionist history.
In Grundgesetze, Frege o¯ers six basic laws and here presents an abstrac-
tion principle as one of the basic laws of his formal system. Having previ-
ously shown Hume’s Principle to be inadequate as a definition for the con-
cept cardinal number, Basic Law V takes that very same form by fixing the
22“[W]e can never, to take a crude example, decide by means of our definitions whether any
concept has the number Julius Caesar belonging to it, whether this familiar conqueror of Gaul is
a number or not.” (Frege, 1884, p. 68)
23For example, Frege provides definitions of zero, natural numbers, and successor. However,
as shown by Boolos and Heck (1998), Frege’s sketch in §§82–83 of the existence of the succes-
sor, having previously established its uniqueness, is confused and ultimately unsuccessful. This
situation is remedied in Grundgesetze where Frege o¯ers a correct proof. See also Heck (2011a,
ch. 3).
24Compare here also §107, where Frege suggests that drawing on extensions of concepts is not,
ultimately, of great importance for his logicism. These are puzzling remarks that are still debated
in current Frege scholarship.
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History of Abstractionism 9
identity-conditions for value-ranges by means of co-extensionality as the rele-
vant equivalence relation. It is clear that Frege did not regard Basic Law V as a
definition—he says so explicitly in the second volume of Grundgesetze (§146,
p. 148, fn. 1)—and so he did not change his mind as to the force of the Caesar
Problem; but given this, it is equally clear that the concept value-range is either
still presupposed as known or based on something di¯erent.25
What exactly the philosophical role of Basic Law V in Grundgesetze is—
that is whether Frege himself should be regarded as a semantic or even epis-
temic abstractionist—is itself part of a lively debate in Frege scholarship. With-
out doubt, however, Frege was a mathematical abstractionist: abstraction prin-
ciples play a crucial part in the formal system that Frege presents. Part II of
Grundgesetze shows step by step, in a manner exemplifying the ideal of gapless
proofs, how we can, taking an abstraction principle as a basic law of logic,
arrive at arithmetic.
However, as is well known, Frege’s logicist project failed: Basic Law V is
inconsistent in the system of Frege’sGrundgesetze. In the Afterword to volume
II of Grundgesetze, Frege gives an account of the antinomy reformulated in his
formal system and then o¯ers a fix—replacing Basic Law V by so-called V0:
–" f (") = –"  (") $ 8x x = –" f (") _ x = –"  (") _ f (x) =   (x)  (V0)
For the special case of extensions, V0 states that the extensions of two concepts
are the same if and only if the same objects fall under these concepts, with the
possible exception of these extensions themselves (Frege, 1903, vol. II, p. 262).
We may assume that Frege later realised that this would not su˘ce since
he never published further work based on V0. Indeed, V0 is inconsistent with
the assumption that there are at least two distinct objects.26 More intriguingly,
Frege seems to think that the paradox does not merely concern Basic Law V
but also a¯ects the status of abstraction principles in general. In a letter to
Russell, Freg considers other abstraction principles but concludes that “the
di˘culties here, however, are the same as with the transformation of a gen-
erality of an equality in a value-range equality.”27 So, it seems that ultimately
25Frege does consider a version of the Caesar Problem in §10 of volume I. How this fits into
a broader interpretation of Frege’s philosophy is another big issue in Frege scholarship. For an
extremely insightful discussion of the role of the Caesar Problem in Frege’s mature theory, see
Heck (2011a) and (Heck, 2012, part I).
26In fact, V0 is arguably inconsistent in the system of Grundgesetze, because that system entails
the existence of two objects: the True and the False. See the thorough investigation in Cook
(forthcoming). Le niewiski was apparently the first person to discover the inconsistency of V0
with the assumption that there are at least two objects (reported by Soboci ski (1949–1950, 1984),
§IV). The result was popularised by Quine (1955). Linsky and Schumm (1971) seem to have been
the first to explicitly recognise the one element model of V0. See also Geach (1956), Dummett
(1973), Linsky and Schumm (1973), Klement (2002, pp. 56–57), Landini (2006), Landini (2012,
ch. 6), and Heck (2012, ch. 4).
27Frege (1902), p. 224; the English translation in Gabriel et al. (1980, p 141) erroneously inserts
a “not” between “are” and “the same”.
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10 Introduction to Abstractionism
Frege not only gave up on his logicism but also had more general misgivings
about the prospect of Abstractionism as a whole.28
1.3 ABSTRACTIONISM AND NEO-FREGEANISM
Wright’s defense of neo-Fregeanism in Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Ob-
jects (1983) triggered a revival of Abstractionism. Wright defends versions
of semantic, epistemic, and ontological Abstractionism and came to regard
Hume’s Principle as the main foundational principle for our grasp of the con-
cept cardinal number, our knowledge of arithmetic, and our knowledge of
numbers as objects. Shortly after the publication, Wright was joined by Bob
Hale (1987) as another proponent of neo-Fregeanism. Neo-Fregeanism so un-
derstood adopts Frege’s assumption of classical (higher-order) logic. Neil Ten-
nant (1987), on the other hand, provided a detailed formal derivations of the
Peano–Dedekind axioms within a free intuitionistic relevant logic, and has
since developed a view called constructive logicism (see also Tennant (2009)).
A further distinct form of neo-logicism inspired by Frege’s Grundgesetze is
Edward Zalta’s defense of modal logicism (Zalta, 1999).29 In general, there
are now various position that adopt the label “neo-logicism” and take Hume’s
Principle (or a suitable version thereof) as a foundation of natural number
arithmetic.30 We are not able to provide a survey of the di¯erent forms of
neo-logicism here (see however the survey in Tennant (2014)), much less as-
sess them. Rather, we focus mainly on Hale and Wright’s version of Neo-
Fregeanism which was defended in numerous articles and books since 1983.31
Naturally, the various philosophical concerns raised in the context of Hale
and Wright’s conception may also be raised with regards to other forms of
logicism. We hope that future research will help to establish how well other
forms of neo-logicism fare with respect to them, and how the di¯erent posi-
tions compare.32
At bottom, the possibility of this revival of logicism is based on the dis-
covery of Frege’s Theorem by Wright (1983, pp. 158–169). In what follows,
28See here also Blanchette (2016). Also note that V0 is itself already problematic if viewed as an
abstraction principle: there are occurrences of the value-range operator on the right-hand side of
the abstraction principle, and so the explanandum appears in the explanans.
29See also Linsky and Zalta (1995), Zalta (2000); moreover, see Anderson and Zalta (2004) for
a di¯erent approach.
30For further examples of broadly (neo-)logicist approaches to arithmetic, see Antonelli and
May (2005), Boccuni (2010, 2013), Bostock (1974–79), Demopoulos (1998, 2000), Fine (2002),
Heck (1997a, 2011a), Hodes (1984), Linnebo (forthcoming), Rayo (2002, 2005, 2013, ch. 3–4),
Urbaniak (2010), and Wehmeier (1999), amongst many others.
31Most notably in Wright (1983), Hale (1987), and Hale and Wright (2000).
32The beginnings of such a debate may be found in Linsky and Zalta (2006), Ebert and Rossberg
(2006), Ebert and Rossberg (2009), and Zalta (2009).
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Abstractionism and Neo-Fregeanism 11
we swiftly outline some of the main results of mathematical Abstractionism
to provide a technical background for this volume.33
A fully rigorous proof of Frege’s Theorem in a classical setting was first
presented by Boolos (1990); see also the detailed exposition and discussion
in Heck (2011a).34 Heck (1997a) has since shown that an abstraction princi-
ple weaker than Hume’s Principle su˘ces for the foundation of natural num-
ber arithmetic: so-called Finite Hume, a version of Hume’s Principle in which
the range of the second-order variables is restricted to finite concepts. Frege
Arithmetic—i.e., the second-order logic plus Hume’s Principle—was shown to
be equiconsistent with second-order arithmetic by Boolos (1987)—the model
Boolos provides for Hume’s Principle was previously hinted at by Geach
(1976); see also the (independent) results by Hodes (1984), Burgess (1984),
and Hazen (1985).
The success of mathematical Abstractionism is not restricted to capturing
natural number arithmetic, however. Much work has gone into investigating
the viability of abstractionist foundations for other areas of mathematics. A
first step is to extend the abstractionist treatment to real analysis, while a more
ambitious goal is providing an abstractionist set theory strong enough to yield
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.
An approach to analysis inspired by Richard Dedekind’s construction of
the reals35 was developed by Stewart Shapiro (2000) (see also Wright (2000)),
through step-wise abstraction of integers, rationals, and real numbers. We start
with an abstraction principle for ordered pairs, ha, bi:
ha, bi = hc, di $ (a = c ^ b = d)
Ordered pairs of natural numbers (provided by Hume’s Principle) can then
be utilized to define integers. This proceeds via an abstraction principle for
di erences:
Di¯ha, bi = Di¯hc, di $ (a + d = b + c)
Integers can be identified with these di¯erence. Since we are working in second-
order logic, addition and multiplication for integers can be explicitly defined.
The next step is an abstraction principle for quotients, using the defined inte-
gers and multiplication:
Qhm, ni = Qhp, qi $  (n = 0 ^ q = 0) _ (n , 0 ^ q , 0 ^m ⇥ q = n ⇥ p) 
Rational numbers are then identified with quotients Qhm, ni, where n , 0.
Defining again addition and multiplication, this time for the rationals, and
33Cook (2007) collects a number of important essays on the mathematics of abstraction.
34As we noted above Tennant (1987) o¯ers a detailed proof using a free intuitionistic relevant
logic. See also Bell (1999) for a discussion of Hume’s Principle in a constructive setting. Shapiro
and Linnebo (2015) show that Hume’s Principle embedded in intuitionistic logic yields Heyting
Arithmetic.
35Dedekind (1872); regarding the question to what extent Dedekind himself was a logicist see
Demopoulos and Clark (2005), Reck (2013), Reck (forthcoming), Yap (forthcoming); see also
Tait (1996).
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12 Introduction to Abstractionism
also defining the natural less than-relation, we use a final abstraction principle,
called Cut Abstraction:
Cut(P ) = Cut(Q) $ 8r (P  r $ Q  r )
‘P  r ’ holds for a concept P (applying to rationals) and a rational r if and
only if every rational that is P is less than or equal to r . We can now iden-
tify real numbers as those cuts Cut(P ) where the rationals falling under P are
bounded above.
The procedure above yields uncountably many reals that form an ordered
field that has the least-upper-bound property, as required for the real numbers.
This approach has a decidedly structural feel however. A more object-oriented
approach was in fact the first proposal for an abstractionist foundation of real
analysis. It is due to Bob Hale (2000b), and arguably more Fregean in charac-
ter (Wright (2000), Hale and Wright (2005, §6)). Hale proposes a first-order
abstraction principle that abstracts reals directly from pairs of quantities:
Rha, bi = Rhc, di $ E(ha, bi, hc, di)
where E is an equivalence relation on pairs of quantities. While more Fregean
in spirit, this approach has open questions regarding the nature of quantities
and the possibility of a purely logical definition of the required equivalence
relation E. Moreover, further research needs to establish whether the resulting
theory can yield a su˘ciently large ontology—that is, a continuum—and can
thus interpret real analysis.
As mentioned above, the ambitious aim is an abstractionist foundation of
set theory.36 The abstraction principle that might have seemed promising for
a foundation of set theory is, of course, Basic Law V. As explained earlier (see
footnote 2 above), if we restrict the range to concepts, rather than all functions,
Basic Law V states that two concepts have the same extension if and only if
they are co-extensional:
–"F " = –"G" $ 8x(F x $ Gx) (V)
Extensions of concepts would be su˘ciently similar to classes37 to underwrite
set theory. Alas, Basic Law V provides a wee bit too much in Frege’s system.
Frege’s first instinct was to restrict Basic Law V in order to avoid the in-
consistency, but as already mentioned (§1.2), he did not go about it in the
36For assessments of the prospects of an abstractions set theory see, for instance, Clark (1993),
Shapiro and Weir (1999), Hale (2000a), Cook (2003a), Shapiro (2003), Linnebo and Uzquiano
(2009), Cook (2016).
37In the second volume of Grundgesetze (1903), §147, Frege concurs: “When logicians have
long spoken of the extension of a concept and mathematicians have spoken of sets, classes, and
manifolds, then such a conversion forms the basis of this too; for, one may well take it that what
mathematicians call a set, etc., is really nothing but the extension of a concept, even if they are
not always clearly aware of this.”
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Abstractionism and Neo-Fregeanism 13
right way. George Boolos (1989) also proposes a restriction of Basic Law V,
but bases it on the limitation-of-size approach to set theory.38 The abstraction
principle Boolos proposes states that two concepts have the same extension if
and only if they are co-extensional unless the concepts are “too big”. Concepts
are consider to be too big just in case they are the same size as the universe.
The latter property is expressible in second-order logic again: as a one-to-one
correspondence with the concept of self-identity. If we call this property ‘Big’,
Boolos’s abstraction principle for extensions reads like this:
Ext(F ) = Ext(G) $ ((Big(F ) ^ Big(G)) _ 8x(F x $ Gx)) (New V)
We may define a set to be the extension of a concepts unless the concept is big:
Set(x) =df 9F (x = Ext(F ) ^ ¬Big(F ))
and define membership for extensions as:
x 2 y =df 9F (F x ^ y = Ext(F ))
Restricted to sets thus defined, the second-order theory containing New V
proves the ZF principles of extensionality, empty set, pairing, separation, and
replacement, but not union. The extension of Big concepts, call it “Bad”, is still
an object in the theory, but Bad cannot be a set on pain of inconsistency. The
union of the singleton set containing Bad, however, would have to be a set
whose members are all the elements of Bad, which cannot be. New V thus
in fact entails the negation of union. We can, however, reformulate union: in-
stead of saying that the union of a set S is the set containing all and only those
objects that are members of members of S , we restrict the definiens by stipulat-
ing that the union of S be the set containing all and only those elements that
are members of the sets that are members of S (thus excluding the members of
Bad, should Bad be a member of S ). Formally:
8x⇥Set(x) ! 9y Set(y) ^ (Union⇤ )
8z[z 2 y $ 9w(Set(w) ^ (z 2 w ^ w 2 x))] ⇤
The occurrence of ‘Set(w )’ expresses the restriction to members that are sets
explained above. Note that with this restriction in place, the union⇤ of the
singleton of Bad is the empty set. New V entails union⇤.
New V does not, however, entail infinity, power set, or foundation. Of
these, foundation alone can be recaptured if we further restrict the scope of
sets taken into account. The obvious restriction is to pure sets—those that can
38See Hallett (1984) for a careful and thorough study of the limitation-of-size conception of set
and a comparison with the iterative conception.
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14 Introduction to Abstractionism
be “build up” from the empty set, as it were. Let a concept F be closed exactly
when all sets, all of whose members are F , are also F :
Closed(F ) $df 8y((Set(y) ^ 8z(z 2 y ! F z)) ! F y)
We can define the pure sets as those objects that fall under all closed concepts:39
Pure(x) $df 8F (Closed(F ) ! F x)
New V proves that foundation holds for pure sets.40
While the set theory gained from New V certainly is to be booked as a
considerable success, it still falls short of full ZF set theory. Roy Cook (2003b)
sets out to remedy the shortcoming. Cook aims for a set theory based on ab-
straction principles that captures the iterative conception of set. His starting
point is an abstraction principle for ordinals, the Size-Restricted Ordinal Ab-
straction Principle, SOAP. To get there, consider the obvious, but owing to the
the Burali-Forti Paradox inconsistent, Order-Type Abstraction Principle:
Ot(R) = Ot(S) $ R   S (OAP)
where ‘ ’ denotes the second-order definable relation of being isomorphic. In-
troducing a restriction to relations that are well-ordered41 (WO) and whose
field is not Big (analogous to the way ‘Big’ is defined above), we may arrive at
the consistent Size-Restricted Ordinal Abstraction Principle:
Ord(R) = Ord(S) $ (SOAP)⇥ (¬WO(R) _ Big(R)) ^ (¬WO(S) _ Big(S))  _ 
WO(R) ^WO(S) ^ ¬Big(R) ^ ¬Big(S) ^ R   S ⇤
The abstracta provided by SOAP are used to enumerate the stages in the “con-
struction” of the iterative hierarchy. Moreover, SOAP is satisfiable on all and
only infinite domains.
It follows the definition of ‘being at the stage of (ordinal) ↵’. The formal
definition is omitted here for the sake of brevity, but, roughly, there will be
a base stage, which consists of elements of a chosen basis (if any), and each
subsequent stage will contain that basis as well as all those extensions that
only contain objects from prior stages. Let ‘Bad’ be true of a concept if there
is no well-ordered ordinal ↵ such that all object falling under that concept are
39The rationale, roughly, is that the empty set, not having any members, has to fall under every
closed concept; hence, so does its singleton; hence, so do the sets that contain only one or both of
these, and so on. See also Boolos (1989), Theorems 1 and 2, for the adequacy of the definition.
40New V also proves that foundation holds for hereditary sets (in the usual sense). All pure sets
(in the sense defined above) are hereditary, but not vice versa. For an extensive study of non-pure
hereditary sets in the context of New V set theory see Jané and Uzquiano (2004).
41Well-ordered in the usual sense, which is second-order definable; see Shapiro (1991, p. 106),
Cook (2003b, §4).
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Abstractionism and Neo-Fregeanism 15
at the stage of ↵. With these notions in hand, we can formulate the abstraction
principle Newer V :
Ext(F ) = Ext(G) $ [8x(F x $ Gx) _ (Bad(F ) ^ Bad(G))] (Newer V)
Even in this informal presentation, the reader will have noticed a circu-
larity: Newer V introduces extensions, using “being at the stage of ↵”, on
the right-hand-side of the abstraction principle; but extensions feature in the
definiens of “being at the stage of ↵”. Cook (2003b, §5) shows that there are
equivalent recursive formulations available, which, if metaphors are permissi-
ble, also highlight the mutual “seesawing up” of ordinal stages and extensions
in an imagined step-wise construction: the ordinal stages form a spine for the
hierarchy of extensions, but more extensions also allow adding more ordinal
stages, which, in turn, allows the hierarchy of extensions to be built up further,
and so on, indefinitely.
‘Set’ and ‘2’ can be defined as for New V above. Restricting the relevant
quantifiers to sets, Newer V entails extensionality, empty set, pairing, separation,
union⇤ (but not union), and powerset. Restricting further to pure sets, we can
prove foundation, just like in the case of New V; also union holds for pure
sets.42
SOAP plus Newer V does not entail replacement, and despite SOAP only
having infinite models, SOAP plus Newer V does not in general entail infinity
(i.e., the existence of an infinite set). They do, however, together with an “ax-
iom of infinity”, i.e., the claim that the basis (as mentioned above) contains all
finite well-ordered ordinals.43
Neither NewV (expressing the abstractionist limitation-of-size conception
of set), nor SOAP plus Newer V (expressing the abstractionist iterative con-
ception of set) thus provides a set theory as strong as (second-order) ZF. The
situation changes, if we adopt both New V and Newer V in tandem. First,
however, note the divergence from the original abstractionist claim, according
to which terms for abstract are implicitly defined by a single abstraction prin-
ciple. We might be able to finess the situation regarding New V and Newer
V. If Finite Hume and Hume’s Principle are about the same abstract objects
(as one might not implausibly argue), then perhaps New V and Newer V can
govern the extension-operator in concert. (See the discussions by Fine (2002,
esp. p. 49) and Cook (2003b, §9).)
Setting this discussion aside, the technical results are as follows: the second-
order theory containing all three abstraction principles, New V, Newer V,
and SOAP,44 is consistent, and with the definitions of ‘Set’ and ‘2’ as above,
42Union also holds for hereditary sets (see fn. 40 above), but foundation does not.
43Let us call the non-sets urelemente. It is tempting to think of the basis as the collection of
urelemente, but there is in fact no guarantee that it contains all or even only urelemente.
44Interestingly, in this setting, SOAP can be dispensed with: instead of the ordinals provided by
SOAP, the stages can be ordered according to the more “conventional” ordinals (transitive pure
sets, well-ordered by ‘2’) supplied by New V, but some complicating adjustments in New V and
Newer V are required; see Cook (2003b, p. 90, n. 30).
i
i
“Abstractionism_OUP_for_copyediting” — 2016/4/20 — 11:40 — page 16 — #25 i
i
i
i
i
i
fir
st,
un
co
rre
cte
d p
ro
of
—
fo
r c
op
y-e
di
tin
g o
nl
y
16 Introduction to Abstractionism
it proves that ‘Big’ and ‘Bad’ are co-extensional and that all non-sets (or ure-
lemente) are in the basis.45 Moreover, we capture all ZF axioms except foun-
dation and infinity. If we assume, in addition, that there are infinitely many
non-sets we can prove infinity (thanks to the fact that all urelemente are now
in the basis). Note that obtaining infinitely many non-sets may be straightfor-
ward for the abstractionist, if the cardinal numbers governed by, say, Finite
Hume,46 are not identical to extensions—that is, if we can suppose a favorable
solution regarding the question of the identity of abstracta governed by di¯er-
ent abstraction principles (Cook (2003b, §10); see also Fine (2002), Cook and
Ebert (2005), Mancosu (2015b)). Moreover, once again, foundation holds for
pure sets. With theses caveats, full second-order ZF is recaptured by way of
abstraction.
Mathematical Abstractionism has been developed in a variety of other di-
rections, exploring further aspects of abstractionist mathematics and extend-
ing its reach. For instance (with no claim to completeness), Graham Leach-
Krouse (2015) investigates structural abstraction principles; Shay Logan (2015,
2016) presents abstractionist foundations for category theory; Morgan Thomas
(ms) proposes a single third-order abstraction principle on isomorphisms as an
approach to set theory; Stewart Shapiro and Geo¯rey Hellman (2016) investi-
gate an abstraction principle for points in a point-free geometry; James Studd
(forthcoming) proposes a dynamic approach to abstraction.
These advances in the mathematics of abstraction, of course, do not by
themselves answer the philosophical questions that arise for Abstractionism,
and indeed they raise further philosophical problems. In the following two
sections, we turn our attention to philosophical and mathematical challenges
for Abstractionism—and with that to the contents of this volume.
1.4 PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTIONISM: CHALLENGES
This volume is structured to reflect the main themes of Abstractionism. Part
II deals with the semantic and ontological issues surrounding Abstractionism,
while Part III focuses mainly on the epistemic aspects of Abstractionism.
As discussed above, Frege briefly considered Hume’s Principle as an ex-
planation of number-terms, but rejected it because of the Caesar Problem. An
Abstractionist account of arithmetic that goes back to taking Hume’s Princi-
ple as a fundamental principle meets the problem again. In the first essay of
Part II, “Caesar and Circularity”, William Stirton presents a critical investi-
gation of the solution to the Caesar Problem proposed in Hale and Wright
(2001b).
Another challenge Abstractionism faces has been dubbed the Proliferation
Problem (Heck, 2000). Abstractionism appears to make it too easy to refer to
45Compare footnote 43 above.
46Alas, full Hume’s Principle is inconsistent with this abstractionist set theory, see Cook
(2003b, p. 90, n. 33).
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Philosophical Abstractionism: Challenges 17
abstract objects. Any equivalence relation could in principle do as the right-
hand side of an abstraction principle, no matter how gerrymandered it may be,
or how unusual the resulting abstracta are. Critics object that this leads to an
undue proliferation of abstract objects. Richard Heck develops this criticism
in “The Existence (and Non-Existence) of Abstract Objects” and presents a
solution that gives rise to an account of what it is for abstract objects to exist.
A debate concerning the metaontology of abstractionist accounts of math-
ematics has recently arisen in light of di¯erent interpretations of what Wright
(1983) calls the syntactic priority thesis: singular terms occurring in true atomic
sentences are guaranteed to have a referent—i.e., an object is guaranteed to ex-
ist for the term to pick out. On that basis then, number-terms, assuming they
are singular terms, will be guaranteed to pick out numbers as objects provided
that Hume’s Principle is true. This, however, seems somewhat too easy to es-
tablish platonism, and critics have argued that abstraction principles appear
to stipulate abstract objects into existence, and that Abstractionism hence is
incompatible with a broadly platonist philosophy of mathematics.47
Matti Eklund subjects the ontology of Abstractionism to such a metaon-
tological investigation in “Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-
Fregeanism”. He contrasts maximalism, which he argues follows from Hale
and Wright’s reliance the syntactic priority thesis and which, roughly, holds
that everything that can exist, does exist—a “maximally promiscuous ontolo-
gy”—with other metaontological doctrines including a minimalism endorsed
by Hale and Wright themselves.
Fraser MacBride, in “Neo-Fregean Ontology: Just Don’t Ask Too Many
Questions”, investigates the syntactic priority thesis directly. He presents a
dilemma for the abstractionist: if reality is crystalline, possessing a language-
independent structure, then the thesis is “hostage to cosmological fortune”; if,
on the other hand, reality has plasticity, this seems to be in tension with the
thought that statements about these objects are true of an independent reality.
MacBride argues that ontological quietism is the only option for neo-Fregeans
to meet the challenge: that is, neo-Fregeans need to argue that the question
how language harmonises with reality can be rejected.
In the last chapter of Part II, “The Number of Planets, a Number-Referring
Term?”, Friederike Moltmann challenges the Fregean view that number terms,
like ‘the number of planets’, refer to numbers as abstract object. Moltmann
argues that on the contrary such natural-language expressions refer to number
tropes, that is, properties instantiated in the plurality of objects that a given
statement of number is about.
Part III opens with Philip Ebert’s “A Framework for Implicit Definitions
and the A Priori”. According to the view labeled traditional connection, which
47The origins of this debate can be found in Dummett (1981a,b, 1991); for a discussion of some
of his criticisms, see for example Wright (1998a,b), Hale (1994b), MacBride (2003), and Ebert
(2015). For the more recent metaontological debate see Eklund (2006), Hawley (2007), Sider
(2007), and Hale and Wright (2009).
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18 Introduction to Abstractionism
at least for some time was held by Hale and Wright, abstraction principles
are regarded as a special kind of implicit definitions of the mathematical terms.
Hume’s Principle, for instance, would be seen as an implicit definition of the
concept cardinal number and o¯ers an a priori foundation for classical math-
ematics. Ebert present a general framework for implicit definitions, identifies
the main tenets for this view, and highlights the main challenges it faces.
A new approach to the understanding of the epistemic foundation of ab-
straction principles employs Wright’s notion of entitlement, a type of defeasi-
ble, non-evidential warrant for presuppositions of particular cognitive projects.
In “Abstraction and Epistemic Entitlement: On the Epistemological Status of
Hume’s Principle”, Crispin Wright argues that Hume’s Principle enjoys the
status of an entitlement. Wright argues that the a priori status of our arith-
metical knowledge can be secured in this way.
In the next chapter, “Hume’s Principle and Entitlement”, Nikolaj Peder-
sen takes up the same topic. He investigates the notion of entitlement within
the setting of Abstractionism and asks, inter alia, whether entitlements are
indeed defeasible, as Wright suggests. Further, Pedersen raises a concern he la-
bels “Generosity Problem”: entitlements, he suggests, may seem too easy to
come by, so that a wide range of irrational and bizarre projects would appear
to have entitlements as their basis. He suggests that a proper assessment of the
Generosity Problem highlights the inherent relativity of entitlements.
Part III closes with Agustín Rayo’s “Neo-Fregeanism Reconsidered”. Rayo
presents a platonist account of mathematics that employs a primitive relation:
the just is relation. Just is statements exhibits a tight connection to statements
of metaphysically necessary equivalence. According to the account, for the
number of the planets to be eight just is for there to be eight planets, for in-
stance. Rayo argues that abstraction principles are best understood as just is
statements of the kind he introduces in his more general account.
1.5 MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTIONISM: CHALLENGES
Part IV of this collection focuses on aspects that chiefly concern mathemati-
cal Abstractionism. We start with the so-called Bad Company objection.48 All
abstraction principles are biconditionals featuring statements of identity of
abstracta of a certain type on one side, and the specification of an equivalence
relation on the other. Hume’s Principle is the abstractionists’ poster child. It
gives rise to arithmetic. On the other end, we have Basic Law V—which gives
rise to Russell’s Paradox. But how do we tell the “good” abstraction principles,
like Hume’s Principle, from the “bad” ones, like Basic Law V, when their log-
ical form is fundamentally the same? Requiring that an abstraction principle
48Bad Company concerns were first raised by Neil Tennant (1987, p. 236) and George Boolos
(1987, p. 184); see the discussion in Tennant (2014, §1.2.3). The more recent discussion takes wing
from Dummett (1991, pp. 188–189), Wright (1998a), Dummett (1998), and Wright (1998b). See
also the articles in the special issue on Bad Company edited by Linnebo (2009).
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Mathematical Abstractionism: Challenges 19
has to be consistent may seem ad hoc and unilluminating; moveover, impor-
tantly, it is not even su˘cient.
First, there is the question of the underlying logic in which the consistency
question is to be decided. Terence Parsons (1987) provides a consistency proof
for the first-order fragment of Frege’s system in Grundgesetze, including Basic
Law V. Richard Heck (1996) shows that Basic Law V is consistent in predica-
tive second-order logic. As Kai Wehmeier (1999) and Fernando Ferreira and
Wehmeier (2002) show, Basic Law V is indeed consistent in a second-order
logic with  11-comprehension.
49
Second, even the restriction to abstraction principles that are individually
consistent or perhaps satisfiable in full second-order logic will not su˘ce to de-
marcate the “good” from the “bad” abstraction principles. There are abstrac-
tion principles that are individually consistent, but not consistent with one
another. Hume’s Principle, for instance, is not jointly satisfiable with George
Boolos’s Parity Principle or Wright’s Nuisance Principle.50 Both of these ab-
straction principles require the domain to be finite, whereas Hume’s Princi-
ple is only satisfiable on an infinite domain. Wright (1997) proposes that ac-
ceptable abstraction principles have to be conservative, in the sense that they
should not put any constraints on any objects other than those abstracts that it
introduces. Hume’s Principle passes this test, but the Nuisance Principle does
not: it does not only require that there are only finitely many nuisances, but
indeed that there are only finitely many object in total—a violation of con-
servativeness. The Parity Principle is disqualified for the same reason. While
conservativeness might be a necessary condition, it does not appear to be su˘-
cient: AlanWeir (2003) produces a pair of abstraction principles each of which
is conservative; however, they are not jointly satisfiable.
Roy Cook’s contribution to this volume, “Conservativeness, Cardinality,
and Bad Company”, systematizes the discussion. Cook rigorously formulates
49Wehmeier (1999) and Ferreira and Wehmeier (2002) investigate di¯erent  11 theories, as ex-
plained in the latter publication. Restrictions on the second-order comprehension schema in e¯ect
regulate how much impredicativity is allowed in the definition of predicates. This is achieved by
considering formulae in the pre-fix normal form. If, and only if, the formula in question is logi-
cally equivalent to a formula that features only pre-fix universal second-order quantifiers, and no
other second-order quantifiers, we call the formula ⇧11 . Analogously, we call a formula is ⌃
1
1 if,
and only if, it is equivalent to a formula that features only pre-fix existential second-order quan-
tifiers, and no others. (Note that the block of pre-fixed quantifiers must not be interrupted by
negations.) A formula that is equivalent to both a ⇧11 and a ⌃
1
1 formula is called  
1
1. Accordingly,
in second-order logic with  11-comprehension the comprehension schema is restricted to instances
where the defining open sentence is  11.
Both ⌃11- and ⇧
1
1 -comprehension are inconsistent with Basic Law V, so, in that sense,  
1
1 is the
highest complexity we can allow in the presence of Basic Law V.
See also Fine (2002), Linnebo (2004), Burgess (2005), Visser (2009), Antonelli (2010), Heck
(2011a, ch. 12), Heck (2011b, 2014), Walsh (2012, 2014, 2015, 2016), and Walsh and Ebels-Duggan
(2015), for further technical results in this area.
50Boolos (1990), Wright (1997); given modest assumptions about infinite concepts, the Nui-
sance Principle can indeed be shown to be (proof-theoretically) inconsistent with Hume’s Princi-
ple; see Ebels-Duggan (2015).
i
i
“Abstractionism_OUP_for_copyediting” — 2016/4/20 — 11:40 — page 20 — #29 i
i
i
i
i
i
fir
st,
un
co
rre
cte
d p
ro
of
—
fo
r c
op
y-e
di
tin
g o
nl
y
20 Introduction to Abstractionism
several proposed criteria for acceptable abstraction principles and presents an
ordering of these criteria by relative strength.51 Moreover, he argues that the
correct criterion for acceptable abstraction principles is strong stability.52
Regarding the inconsistency of Frege’s logic presented in his Basic Laws of
Arithmetic, we have mentioned already that the principle that is usually con-
sidered to be the culprit, Basic Law V, is in fact consistent in weak fragments
of second-order logic. Indeed, Dummett (1991) suggests that the impredica-
tivity of the second-order quantifiers is to blame for the inconsistency, rather
than Basic Law V. Øystein Linnebo’s “Impredicativity in the Neo-Fregean
Programme” revisits the debate about this question that takes centre-stage in
the exchange between Boolos (1993) and Dummett (1994). Linnebo examines
the role of impredicative reasoning required for neo-Fregean programme (both
technically and philosophically), and distinguishes two types of impredicativ-
ity that are conflated by Dummett and others. Linnebo suggests that some
restrictions of impredicativity may lead to fruitful abstractionist theories.
In “Abstraction Grounded”, Hannes Leitgeb argues against the very ap-
proach to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable abstraction principles. In-
stead, he develops a groundedness condition for impredicative abstraction prin-
ciples in analogy to Saul Kripke’s theory of truth (Kripke, 1975). The proposal
is that any abstraction principle with impredicative second-order variables is
to be restricted to those of its instances that satisfy certain groundedness re-
quirements.
As mentioned above, set theory is a big issue for Abstractionism. Much
progress has been made, but there currently does not appear to be a contender
for a single abstraction principle that on its own, embedded in some higher-
order logic, gives rise to a theory that is capable of interpreting Zermelo–
Fraenkel set theory without presupposing prior knowledge of set theory, in
some sense.53 A single abstraction principle, viewed as an implicit definition
of set, would be the abstractionists’ ideal.
The assessment of the prospects for an abstractionist foundation for set
theory is the topic that Stewart Shapiro and Gabriel Uzquiano tackle in their
“Ine¯abilityWithin the Limits of Abstraction Alone”. They present an abstraction-
based set theory that allows capturing all of ordinary mathematics, except for
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory itself. In particular, they discuss the extent to
which the thought that the iterative hierarchy, which is underlying standard
set theory, is indefinitely extensible, or “ine¯able” in some sense, is in tension
with an abstractionist foundation.
Part V contains three contributions regarding Frege’s application constraint,
51Cook draws on previous work in this area by Øystein Linnebo (2010) and himself, Cook
(2012).
52An abstraction principle A is strongly stable if and only if there is a cardinal ↵ such that, for
any cardinal , A is satisfiable by a model with cardinality  i¯    ↵.
53Compare Cook (2003b, p. 91 n. 41), regarding the “distraction” principles of Shapiro and
Weir (1999) and Weir (2003).
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sometimes just called “Frege’s Constraint”.54 Frege held that a successful ac-
count of arithmetic, analysis, and so forth, should “present the ways in which
arithmetic [etc.] is applied, even though the application itself is not its subject
matter” (Frege, 2013, vol. II, §159). The application of a mathematical the-
ory should be in some way build into the abstraction principle that provides
the foundation of this part of mathematics: counting all kinds of objects for
natural-number arithmetic; measuring di¯erent kinds of magnitude for real
analysis; etc.
In “On Frege’s Application Constraint”, Paul McCallion investigates the
motivation for the Frege’s Constraint and relates his results to Benacerraf-type
concerns for Abstractionism. Paul Benacerraf (1965) submitted that the exis-
tence of competing but equally successful reduction of the natural numbers—
the prime example being Zermelo’s versus von Neumann’s reduction of car-
dinal numbers to sets—spells doom for a reductionist programme. McCallion
takes this lead and asks whether an analogous problem of alternative, but on
the face of it equally attractive abstractionists account of a given mathematical
theory, may indeed be solved by appeal to the application constraint.
Peter Simons addresses the topic we dodged above by our casual use of
“etc.” after listing the relevant applications for arithmetic and real analysis. In
“Applications of Complex Numbers and Quaternions”, Simons investigates
whether obvious applications for mathematical theories other than natural
number arithmetic and real analysis can be identified. Simons looks at the
cases of complex numbers and quaternions and their physical applications.
The application constraint was important for Frege, but the question may
be raised whether a successful philosophy of mathematics must obey it, or
indeed can do so in full generality. Bob Hale’s contribution, “Definitions of
Numbers and Their Applications”, discusses the issue of this tight connection
between definitions or explanations of fundamental mathematical notions and
their applications that Frege demanded. He compares di¯erent definitions of
natural and real numbers, some of which obey Frege’s constraint and some
of which do not. His discussion investigates whether Frege himself o¯ered a
satisfactory motivation for his constraint and whether there is any other justi-
fication of it available. Hale concludes with suggesting an alternative approach.
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